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A. Background research 
According to the Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 1, the earnings information is a major 
concern for measuring performance or accountability of management. Earnings information also helps the owner 
or other party in measuring the power company's earnings in the future. This has created an opportunity for 
management to take action that can make financial reports into looks better, the manager's actions sometimes 
conflict with the company's goals. In defiance of the one form is earnings management (earnings management) 
(Mohammad Sani et all 2012). 
Earnings management is the impact on the freedom of a manager to choose According to Healy and 
Wahlen (in Theresia, 2005) earnings management is the management's efforts to change the financial statements 
intended to mislead shareholders who want to know the company's performance or to effect a financial report 
containing the earnings information. Earnings management is the impact of a manager the freedom to select and 
use certain accounting methods when record and organize information in the financial statements. 
The concept of corporate governance is in essence calls for better transparency to all users of financial 
statements. Based on these financial statements, it will be seen whether the performance of the company has 
good governance and effective (good corporate governance) and the governance of whether it can reduce the 
opportunistic behavior of management within the company (Cornett et all, 2008). 
The study concluded that an independent commissioner has positive effect but not significant to earnings 
management or profit management. Sylvia Veronica N.P. Siddharta Sirregar and Main (2005), the proportion of 
independent directors and a significant negative effect on the income smoothing (earnings management) 
oporunitis. Cornet et.al (2006). Institutional ownership has no significant effect on earnings management. The 
bigger the stake, the smaller the earnings management practices that occur. Palestine (2006) and Nuryaman 
(2008) 
Companies with free cash flow (free cash flow) is high will have greater opportunities to make profit 
management, because the company indicated face greater agency problems (Chung et al, 2005). Free cash flow 
or free cash flow is defined as cash flow actually available for distribution to shareholders and creditors after the 
company invested in fixed assets and working capital needed to sustain the operations of the company. Brigham 
and Daves (2003) 
The object of research in this study is perbankan.Industri banking industry has different characteristics 
with other industries. The banking industry has tighter regulation than any other industry, for example, a bank 
must have a Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) minimum and provide financial statements as a healthy 
determination whether or not a bank by Bank Indonesia 
Free cash flow Variable positive influence on income smoothing practices. according Negrea (2009) 
good corporate governance is the proportion of independent board significant positive effect on earnings 
management. Muh.Arief Ujiyantho (2007) Partially independent board which is a negative effect on earnings 
management. Is'da Rahmawati (2013) Based on the background that has been presented, the consistency is not 
the research that has been there a reason to re-examine the research title "Effect of Free Cash Flow and Good 
Corporate Governance (GCG) Profit Management Of The Banking Companies listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange Year 2010-2013 "to be important to investigate. 
B. Problem Formulation 
Based on the description of the background issues that have been described above, then that becomes a problem 
on penelititan formulation are: 
1. Is Free Cash Flow effect on Earnings Management? 
2. Is the Committee Commissaries  effect on Earnings Management? 
3. Is the Committee Audit  an effect on Earnings Management? 
4. What is the effect on the Institutional Ownership Earnings Management? 
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C. Objectives and Research Contribution 
In connection with the background as well as the formulation of the problem as has been mentioned above, this 
study is intended to try to study and assess the influence of Free Cash Flow and Good Corporate Governance on 
Earnings Management, as for the purpose of this study is: 
1. To determine the effect of the Free Cash Flow Earnings Management. 
2. To determine the effect of the Board of Commissioners, Audit Committee,  
    Institutional Ownership on Earnings Management. 
D. The contribution of this research: 
1. For the management 
    This research is expected to provide insight to management to avoid earnings management actions that can 
harm self and companies in the public eye and can reduce public confidence in the company. 
2. For investors 
    This research is expected to provide information to investors to assess the  performance of the company before 
investing in a company. 
Literature review and Hypotheses  
A. Literatur Review 
1. Teori Agency (Agency Theory) 
Perspective agency relationship is the basis used to understand the corporate governance.Menurut Jansen and 
Meckling (1976) agency theory is: "The theory that reveals the relationship between the owner (principal) and 
management (agent). This theory explains that the agency relationship arises when one or more persons (the 
principal) employs another person (the agent) to provide a service and then delegate decision-making authority 
to the agent ". 
The onset of earnings management can be explained by the theory of agency. As an agent, manager 
morally responsible to optimize the benefit of the owner (principal) and in return will receive compensation 
according to the contract. According to Jensen and Mecking (1976)), this agency theory states that an agency 
relationship arises when one party (principal) hired another party (the agent) to perform some services on its 
behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent. Principals are stockholders or 
investors, while the agent in question is the managing company's management. 
2. Financial Statements 
Agency theory mengehendaki their clear separation between the owner and manager of Integration led to the 
owner no longer involved in the management of the company and the management is done by people who are 
considered professional and trusted owner Integration. 
The financial statements is to present reliable information regarding the company's assets, liabilities 
companies, corporate profits, and other information that is appropriate or relevant to the decision of the wearer. 
3. Earning  management 
a. Definition of Earning Management 
  Earnings management can be interpreted as an act of management that affect reported earnings and provide 
economic benefits to the company wrong, so that in the long run it would be very disturbing even jeopardize 
the company (Merchant and Rockness, 1994) 
b. Factors Earning Management 
According to Scott (1997: 352-364), there are several factors that encourage managers perform earnings 
management practices, namely: 
1. Planning Bonus 
These factors disclosed by Healy (1985), that the manager who had information on the company's net profit 
will act opportunistically to maximize earnings management with current profit. 
2. Other Motivation 
Another factor that may encourage managers to perform earnings management is politics, taxes, CEO 
turnover, IPO, and the importance of information to investors. 
a)  Political Motive 
Earning management is used to reduce the company's reported earnings publik.Perusahaan tend to reduce 
reported earnings because of the public pressure that caused the government set more stringent regulations. 
b) Tax Motif 
Motivation tax savings motivates most nyata.Berbagai earnings management accounting method used for the 
purpose of income tax savings. 
c) Substitution CEO 
CEOs nearing retirement will tend to raise revenue to increase their bonus and if the company's performance 
poor will maximize revenues in order not to be dismissed. 
d) IPO (Initial Public Offering) 
Information on the profit into a signal on the company's value on the company that will conduct an IPO. This 
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implies that the company manager akango pubic perform managementmenaikan earning the company's stock 
price. 
e) The Importance of Providing Information to Investors 
Information on the company's performance should be presented to investors that earnings reporting needs to 
be presented so that investors still judge that the company is in a good performance. 
3. Good Corporate Governance 
a. Definition Good Good Corporate Governance 
According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Corporate Governance, 
namely: 
"Corporate governance is the system by the which business corporations are directed and controlled. The 
corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities of participants Among 
different in the corporation, such as, the board managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out 
the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, It also Provides the 
structure through the which the company objectives are set, and the means of Attaining Reviews those 
objectives and monitoring performance. " 
Good Corporate Governance Practices in Commercial Banks in Indonesia was reinforced by the release of 
Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 15/15 / DPNP / 2013 dated 29 April 2013 regarding the implementation 
of Good Corporate Governance for Banks. Definition of Good Corporate Governance is a procedure Keola 
Banks that apply the principles of openness (Transparency), accountability (accountability), liability 
(responsibility), independency (independency) and fairness (fairness). 
b. Principles of Corporate Governance PrinsipGood 
    Explanation for the GCG principles are as follows: 
1) Transparency (Transparency) 
    Basic principles to maintain objectivity in doing business, companies must provide material and relevant 
information in a way that is easily accessible and understood by stakeholders. 
2) Accountability (Accountability) 
Basic principles Companies must be accountable for performance in a transparent and fair. Therefore, the 
company must be properly managed, scalable, and according to the company while taking into account the 
interests of shareholders and other stakeholders. Accountability is a necessary precondition 
to achieve continuous performance. 
3) Responsibility (CSR) 
Companies must comply with legislation and to implement responsibilities towards society and the 
environment so that it can maintain the continuity of the business in the long term and to be recognized as a 
good corporate citizen. 
4) Independence (independency) 
    To accelerate the implementation of the GCG principles, the company must be managed independently so that 
each organ of the company does not dominate the other and can not be interfered with by other parties. 
5) Fairness and Equality (Fairness) 
In conducting its activities, the company must always take into consideration the interests of shareholders and 
other stakeholders based on the principles of fairness and equality. 
c. Independent Commissioner 
Commissioners describe the culmination of the company's control system. Commissioners have a dual role, 
namely: a role for monitoring and validated (ratification). Monitoring functions performed by the board of 
commissioners is affected by the number or size of the board of commissioners for the implementation of 
effective control, the board of directors include the members of the Management of outside independent. 
The existence of an independent Commissioner stipulated in Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 15/15 / 
DPNP / 2013 dated April 29, 2013, the Independent Commissioner is set at less than 50% (fifty percent) of 
the total number of Commissioners. 
d. The Audit Committee 
Based on Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 15/15 / DPNP / 2013 dated April 29, 2013, the Board of 
Commissioners must make up at least Audit Committee, Remuneration and Nomination Committee, in order 
to support the effectiveness of the duties and responsibilities of the Board of Commissioners. 
The third important role in the corporate governance committee, namely: 
Audit Committee (Audit Committee) Provides an overview of the problem of accounting, financial reporting 
and explanation, the internal control systems as well as the independent auditor (www.cic-fcgi.org). 
Klein (2002) in Siallagan and Machfoedz (2006), provides empirical evidence that companies that establish 
independent audit committees reporting profits with the content of discretionary accruals smaller than the 
Integration which do not form an independent audit committee. 
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e. Institutional ownership 
Institutional ownership is the percentage of voting rights amount dimiiki by institutions (Beiner et.al. in 
Ujiyantho and Scout, 2007) institutional .Kepemilikan has the ability to control the management through 
effective monitoring process. Cornet et al, (2006: 14) found evidence that the control measures undertaken by 
a company and the institutional investors can restrict the behavior of the manager. 
4. Free Cash Flow 
a. The definition of Free Cash Flow 
Rose et al (2000) defines free cash flow as the company's cash that can be distributed to creditors or 
shareholders who are not used to working capital or an investment in fixed assets. Free cash flow shows a 
picture for investors that the dividend distributed by the company are not merely "strategy" around the 
market with the intention of increasing the value of the company. 
Free cash flow is the cash flow of funds that can be distributed or made available for distribution to investors, 
both shareholders and lenders after deducting the company's investment in fixed assets and working capital to 
sustain the company's growth (Bambang Wahyudiono, 2014: 97). 
b. Calculation of Free Cash Flow 
Penman (2007) defines that free cash flow is the cash a company that can be distributed to creditors or 
shareholders is not required for working capital investment in fixed assets. 
 
     Figure 2.1. 
Framework Research 
Hypothesis 
1. Free Cash Flow Against EarningManagement 
Jensen (1986) states that if a company's free cash flow is not used or invested to maximize the interests of 
shareholders, then it can cause problems of agency. White et.al. (2003: 68) revealed that the besarfree cash 
flow available within an enterprise, the more healthy the company.  Kangarluei et al. (2001) provide further 
evidence that the size of the FCF of a company does not have a significant effect on the occurrence of 
earnings management. From the results of the above studies, the hypothesis in this study are: 
H1: Free Cash Flow effect on earnings management. 
2. Effect of GCG Against Earning Management 
Indicators of good corporate governance mechanisms as follows: 
a. Independent Commissioner Against Profit Management 
The role of the board of commissioners is expected to improve earnings quality by limiting the level of 
earnings management through the monitoring financial functions.Monitoring report conducted by the board 
of commissioners is affected by the number or size of the board of commissioners Vafeas (2006) 
Companies that have a proportion of board members who come from outside the company or outside director 
can influence the actions of earnings management. Klein (2002). If the commissioners from outside increase 
surveillance measures, it also will be associated with the increasingly low use of discretionary accruals 
(Cornett et. Al., 2006). 
Coalition shareholder outside the controlling shareholders do not have the ability to come together and affect 
earnings management practices in entities. Fromresults of several studies on the above hypothesis in this 
study are: 
H2a: Independent Commissioner effect on earnings management. 
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b. The Audit Committee Against Erning  Management 
Independent audit committee reported earnings with a smaller accrual content compared with companies that 
do not form an independent audit committee. Klein (2002), tested the effectiveness of audit committees in 
reducing earnings management conducted by the management. His research states that the audit committee is 
able to protect the interests of shareholders of earnings management actions undertaken by management. Xie, 
Davidson and Dadalt (2003) hypothesis in this study are: 
H2b: The Audit Committee effect on earnings management. 
c. Against Institutional Ownership Earning  Management 
Evidence that the control measures undertaken by a company and the institutional investors can restrict the 
behavior of managers. Supervision or monitoring so that action can encourage managers to be more oriented 
to the interests of shareholders and reduce opportunistic actions are only concerned with their own interests. 
Cornett et.al. (2006), 
Institutional ownership has a significant effect on earnings management. Results of research Wahyu (2010) 
In contrast to the results of research stating that institutional ownership has no effect on the results of several 
research earning management. From above, Ujiyantho (2007) and also Irawan (2013) hypothesis in this study 
are: 
H2C: Institutional Ownership effect on earnings management. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
A. Design Research 
The study design used in this research is causality. Method of causality research is research that describes the 
influence of the dependent variable with the  independent  variable is the effect of free  cash flow and good   
corporate    governance to   earnings  management. The   data   that will   be used  derived from the  Indonesia 
Stock Exchange website is ww.idx.co.id period of 2012 to 2015. 
B. Definitions and Operationalization  of Variable 
The research model consists of two variables, namely the dependent variable and independent variables. The 
following is an explanation of the operational definition and measurement of each variable. 
Table 3.1 
Operational oVariables and Measurement Scale 
No Variabel Measurement Scale 
measurement 
1 Free Cash Flow (X1) FCS = CFO – CFI 
 
Rasio 
2 Independent 
Commissioner Board 
(X2) 
 
 
Number of independent directors 
 
The total number of commissioners Companies 
 
Rasio 
3 Audit committee (X3) The number of the company's audit committee 
 
Rasio 
4 Institutional Ownership 
(X4) 
 
shares owned by the institution 
        
Total outstanding share capital 
 
Rasio 
5 Earning manajemen (Y) DACCit = TACCit - NDACit 
 
Rasio 
Source:Data processed researchers in 2015 
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C. Population and Sample Research 
Tabel 3.2 Selection Sample 
No. Discription Amount 
1 Banking firm located in Indonesia that has been listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) in 
2012-2015 
35 
2 Companies that publishes financial statements and annual report in 2012-2015. (15) 
3 Companies in the study gained income position of the year 2012-2015 (2) 
4 The Company reported Corporate Governance report (Corporate Governance) in 2012-2015. (0) 
 Companies are selected to be sampled 18 
 Number observation  period 2012-2015  
 Banking companies as much as 18 X 4 Years  72 
D. Data collection technique 
In this study the sources used are books of literature, libraries, scientific journals, internet, financial reports 
(annual report) and other sources that are relevant to the required data. Data contained in this study were 
obtained from the Stock Exchange in 2009 to 2013. 
E. Method of Analysis 
1) Descriptive Research 
The data are normally distributed, skewness & kurtosis has a value close to zero (Ghozali, 2012). 
2) Classical Assumption Test 
Analysis of classical assumptions that must be met to make decisions is through the F test and t test should not 
be biased by normality test, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity  and autocorrelation test. 
a) Normality Test 
b) Test Multicolinearity 
c) Test Heteroskidastity 
d) Test Autocorrelation 
3) Analysis of Statistics 
Calculation of multiple linear regression analysis can be formulated: 
Y = α + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3+ β3X4 e 
Y  = Earning manajement 
α  = Constanta 
β1, β2, β3, β4 = Coefisien regresi  variabel X1 X2 X3  &X4 
X1  = free cash flow 
X2  = The proportion of independent board 
X3  = the size of the audit committee 
X4  = institusional ownership 
e  = element  of disturbance (error) 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. General description 
This study took a sample of companies belonging to the banking companies are grouped according to the 
tabulation of data in the Indonesia Stock Exchange. In the sampling, using 
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TABLE 4.1 COMPANY NAME THAT IS THE SAMPLE RESEARCH 
NO COMPANY NAME CODE 
   
1 Bank Agroniaga Tbk AGRO 
2 Bank Capital Tbk BACA 
3 Bank Ekonomi Raharja Tbk BAEK 
4 Bank Central Asia Tbk BBCA 
5 Bank Bukopin Tbk BBKP 
6 Bank Nusantara Parahyangan Tbk BBNP 
7 Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk BBRI 
8 Bank Pembangunan Daerah Jawa Barat dan Banten Tbk BJBR 
9 Bank Mandiri Persero Tbk BMRI 
10 Bank Bumi Arta BNBA 
11 Bank Cimb Niaga Tbk BNGA 
12 Bank Sinar Mas Multiartha Tbk BSIM 
13 Bank SwadesiTbk BSWD 
14 Bank Tabungan Pensiunan Nasional Tbk BTPN 
15 Bank Victoria International Tbk BVIC 
16 Bank Artha Graha Intrnasional Tbk INPC 
17 Bank Pan Indonesia Tbk PNBN 
18 Bank Ocbc Nisp Tbk NISP 
B. Descriptive Statistics 
Before the development of the test of significant influence vaiabel free cash flow, independent directors, audit 
committee and institutional ownership to earnings management, it will first be reviewed concerning the 
description of the variables with descriptive statistical analysis. Descriptive statistical analysis results can be seen 
in the table below: 
TABLE 4.2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
EM 72 .0169 .4947 .246432 .1208631 
CASHFLOW 72 6.0000 17.6071 11.939081 3.6771300 
COMISARIS 72 .2500 .9309 .608501 .2170325 
AUDITOR 72 .3753 .6901 .515424 .0764433 
INSTITUSIONAL 72 .5850 .8695 .704692 .0733819 
Valid N (listwise) 72     
C. Test Assumptions And Quality Research Instruments 
1. Normality Test 
TABLE 4.3 
Normality test results Kolmogorov – Smirnov ONE-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov TEST 
 UNSTANDARDIZED RESIDUAL 
N 72 
NORMAL PARAMETERSA,B MEAN .0000000 
STD. DEVIATION .11006469 
MOST EXTREME DIFFERENCES ABSOLUTE .075 
POSITIVE .075 
NEGATIVE -.060 
TEST STATISTIC .075 
ASYMP. SIG. (2-TAILED) .200 
a. Test Distribution Is Normal. 
b. Calculated From Data. 
Source: Secondary Data That Has Been Processed in 2015 
Table 4.3 above can be seen the value of the Kolmogorov Smirnov amounted to 0.75 with the 
Asymp.Sig significant (two-tailed) is equal to 0.200 greater than 0.05, the value showed significant value and it 
can be concluded that the data are normally distributed. 
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FIGURE 4.1. 
FIGURE normality 
Based on the chart above that the data spread value is reflected in the image shows the points spread 
around the line and follow the diagonal line. The graph above makes it clear that the regression model obtained 
normal distribution. 
D. Test Multicollinearity 
Multicolinearity test aims to test whether the regression model found a correlation between independent variables 
(Imam Ghozali, 2012). A good regression model should not happen correlation between the independent variables. 
TABLE 4.4 
TEST RESULTS MULTIKONLINEARITAS 
COEFFICIENTSA 
  Unstandardized Standardized  
T Sig. 
Collinearity 
  
 
 Coefficients Coefficients  Statistics 
    B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .503 .172   2.928 .005     
  Free Cash Flow -.012 .004 -.370 -3.260 .002 .964 1.038 
  Comisaris Independent -.050 .063 -.089 -.788 .434 .970 1.030 
   Audit Commitee .211 .181 .133 1.164 .249 .944 1.060 
 Ownership Institusional -.270 .189 -.164 -1.431 .157 .944 1.059 
Dependent Variable: EM 
Source: Secondary data have been processed in 2015 
The variables in this study have a tolerance value> 0,10dan VIF <10, which means there was no trouble 
multikonlinearitas. 
 
E. Uji Heteroskedasitas 
                   FIGURE 4.2    TEST RESULTS  Heteroskidastity 
In Figure 4.2 shows that the dots formed spread randomly scattered either above or below the number 0 
on the Y axis, that is to say not happen heteroskedastitas. 
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F.Test Autocorrelation 
                                                            TABLE 4.5 
                                             RESULTS autocorrelation 
                                                MODEL SUMMARYB 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .413 a .171 .121 .1133026 2.151 
FIGURE 4.3      REGIONAL CRITERIA TESTING autocorrelation 
Based on the explanation above, it can be seen that DU <DW <4- DU or 1.7366 <2,151 <2.2634 so it 
can be concluded that there is no autocorrelation. 
G. Testing Hypotheses 
1. Simultaneous Regression Analysis (Test F) 
The aim of this testing whether all the independent variables included in the model have influence together or 
simultaneously to the dependent variable is calculated using the F test. 
TABLE 4.6 
SIMULTANEOUS REGRESSION ANALYSIS (FR F) 
ANOVAA 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .177 4 .044 3.448 .013b 
Residual .860 67 .013   
Total 1.037 71    
a. Dependent Variable: Earnimg Management 
 b.Predictors: (Constant),  Ownership Institusional, Independent commissaris, Free Cash Flow, Audit 
Committee 
Source: Secondary data have been processed in 2015 
Based on the calculation in table 4.6 above, ANOVA table values obtained F count amounted to 3,448 
with probability 0.013. The probability figure is smaller than 0:05 (5%). This shows that the free cash flow, 
independent directors, audit committee and managerial ownership jointly effect on earnings management 
significantly 
2. Partial Regression Analysis (Test T) 
To test the relationship between the independent variables partially with the dependent variable, then used a 
statistical t-test. If significant levels of t less than the significance level α = 0.05, these variables have a 
significant relationship. 
TABLE 4.7   PARTIAL TEST RESULTS (TEST T) 
COEFFICIENTSA 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .503 .172  2.928 .005 
FCS -.012 .004 -.370 -3.260 .002 
Commisaris -.050 .063 -.089 -.788 .434 
Auditor .211 .181 .133 1.164 .249 
Institusional -.270 .189 -.164 -1.431 .157 
a. Dependent Variable: EM 
Source: Secondary data have been processed in 2015 
The statistical test t basically shows how far the influence of the explanatory variables or an 
independent individual in explaining the dependent variable or by comparing t arithmetic with t table. If t count  
<t table then there is no significant impact, whereas if  count > t table, then there is a significant effect 
a. From the statistical test t in the table above 4.7 t count  obtained free cash flow amounted to -3260 with a 
significance level of 0.002. From these results, the known value of variable significance of free cash flow is 
less than significant level α = 0:05. While the views of the value t count 3,260 worth of free cash flow is 
greater than t table (df = 72-4-1 = 67) worth 1,998, which means that H0 is rejected and H1 accepted. T 
value indicates that the variable negative free cash flow in the opposite direction have a relationship with 
variable earnings management. This study therefore declared free cash flow is partially significant effect on 
earnings management in the banking company in 2010-2013. 
b. For components of the GCG average gained 0.28 significance level. Of the result known GCG significance 
value greater than the significant level α = 0:05. This study therefore concludes that the average component 
GCG partially no significant effect on earnings management in the banking company in 2010-2013. 
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c. For independent commissioner t value for 0788 with a significance level of 0.434. Of the result known 
independent commissioners significant value greater than the significant level α = 0:05. While the views of 
independent directors t value worth of 0788 is smaller than t table is (df = 72-4-1 = 67) worth 1,998, which 
means that H0 is accepted and rejected H2. This study therefore stated the board independensecara partially 
no significant effect on earnings management in the banking company in 2010-2013. 
d. For the audit committee t value amounted to 1,164 with significance level of 0249. From these results, the 
known value of the audit committee of significance greater than the significant level α = 0:05. While the 
views of the t value of the audit committee amounting to 1,164 smaller than t table is (df = 72-4-1 = 67) 
worth 1,998, which means that H0 is accepted and rejected H3. This study therefore stated the audit 
committee partially no significant effect on earnings management in the banking company in 2010-2013. 
e. For institutional ownership t value of -1431 with a significance level of 0.157. From these results, note the 
significant value of institutional ownership is greater than the significant level α = 0:05. While the views of 
the t value -1 431 worth of institutional ownership is smaller than t table is (df = 72-4-1 = 67) worth 1,998, 
which means that H0 is accepted and rejected H4. This study therefore declare institutional ownership 
partially no significant effect on earnings management in the banking company in 2010-2013. 
3. Analysis of Coefficientof DeterminationR² 
The coefficient of determination (R ²) was used to measure the ability of the model to explain variations in an 
independent variable. Here are the results of calculation of the coefficient of determination hypothesis. 
TABLE 4.8 
RESULTS ANALYSIS DETERMINATION COEFFICIENT 
                MODEL SUMMARYB 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .413a .171 .121 .1133026 2.151 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Institutional Ownership, Independent Commissioner, Free Cash Flow, Audit 
Committee 
b. Dependent Variable: EM 
c. Source: Secondary data have been processed in 2014 
Adjusted R ² of 0121, this means that 12.1% of earnings management variation can be explained by the 
Free Cash Flow, Institutional Ownership, Independent Commissioner, Audit Committee, while the remaining 
87.9% can be explained by factors other than the independent variables. 
H. Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
TABLE 4.9 
RESULTS ANALYSIS OF MULTIPLE LINEAR    
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .503 .172  
FCS 
-.012 .004 
                         -  
                       .370 
Commisaris -.050 .063 -.089 
Auditor .211 .181 .133 
Institusional -.270 .189 -.164 
   Dependent Variable: EM 
   Source: Secondary data were processed in 2015 
The regression equation that can be formulated in this study are: 
 DA = 0503 - 0:50 0.012Fcs- Commissioner + 0.211Audit - Institutional 0270 
Summary results of linear regression analysis on the above table are described as follows: 
A. Constant (a) 
Value Constans (a) is equal to 0.503 means that if all the independent variables equal to 0, the value of earnings 
management would be worth 0.503. 
B. Regression Coefficients (Bi) 
a.  Variable regression coefficient value of free cash flow amounted to -0.12. This means  
     that if the amount of free cash flow increased 1% while other variables held constant,  
       then the management will profit decreased by 1.2%. 
b   Variable regression coefficient value of -0050 Independent Commissioner. This means that if the number of 
Independent Commissioners increased 1% while other variables held constant, then the management will 
profit decreased by 5% 
c.  Variable regression coefficient value of the Audit Committee at +0211. This means that if the number of the 
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Audit Committee increased 1% while other variables held constant, then the management will profit 
increased by 21.1%. 
d.    Variable regression coefficient value of institutional ownership amounted to -0270. This means that if the 
number of institutional ownership increased 1% while other variables held constant, then the management 
will profit decreased by 27%. 
E. Discussion 
TABLE 4:10 
SUMMARY HASI HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
Code Hipothesis Testing conclusion 
 Free cash flow does not affect the earnings management rejected 
 Independent Commissioner effect on earnings management accepted 
 The Audit Committee effect on earnings management accepted 
 Institutional Ownership effect on earnings management accepted 
1. Free Cash Flow Against Profit Management 
Free cash flow (free cash flow) is the actual cash flows that can be distributed to investors after the company 
made all the investments and working capital needed to maintain continuity of operations (Sawir, 2004: 93). The 
results of this study are consistent with research Agustian (2013) which states that the free cash flow 
significantly negative effect on earnings management. This is because companies with high free cash flow likely 
will not perform earnings management, because of the absence of earnings management, the company has been 
able to increase its stock price. 
2. Good Good Corporate Governance Against Profit Management 
Based on the results of the research show that the variables GCG used in this study all had an influence on 
earnings management. It is because the application of GCG in the banking industry is relatively limited only to 
follow a growing trend at the moment and just to show compliance with the conditions imposed by the 
government. This is supported by the weak condition of certainty and the rule of law, culture and business 
environment that is family owned. The results also support the research Pretty Elisa (2014). 
3. Independent Komisarais Against Profit Management 
Based on the results of testing of the hypothesis 2a (H a) it is known that an independent commissioner has no 
effect on earnings management. This can be explained that the size of the board of directors is not a key 
determinant of the effectiveness of supervision of the management company, but the effectiveness of the control 
mechanism, depending on the values, norms and beliefs are acceptable in an organization and the role of the 
commissioners in control activities (monitoring) against management (Jennings, 2005). 
Difficulties in supervising and controlling the actions of management, as well as the difficulty in 
making decisions that are useful for the company (Yermack, 1996) and (Jensen, 1993). Zhou and Chen (2004) 
showed that the size of the board of directors at commercial banks had no effect on earnings management, 
measured by loan loss provisions. 
4. The Audit Committee Against Profit Management 
Based on the results of the hypothesis 2b (H2b) states that the audit committee has no effect on earnings 
management. This result is consistent with Wisdom (2012) which concluded that the audit committee proved no 
effect on earnings management 
5. Ownership Instisusional 
Based on the results of the hypothesis 2c (H2C) states that institutional ownership has no effect on earnings 
management. The results of this study are consistent with the results of research Ujiantho and Scout (2007) 
which menyatkan that institutional ownership variable regression results do not affect the discretionary accrual at 
the 5% significance level. 
This is because the institutional ownership does not have the ability to control the management so as not 
to reduce earnings management. This is also due to institutional investors do not act as sophisticated investors 
who have more ability and opportunity to monitor and discipline the managers to be more focused on the value 
of the companys. 
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